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At present, there appears to be no qualitative dependent model that can
simultaneously account for data sets in which the variable of interest is po-
tentially ordered but also has strong heterogeneity of the observed outcomes.
This heterogeneity of particular outcomes, inherently attracts individuals to
them, in addition to that determined by the individual’s observed character-
istics. An example of such unobserved heterogeneity would be brand-loyalty
(or “captivity”) in a model of consumer choice. Such heterogeneity of the
outcomes, may well result in a pronounced multi-modal distribution of the
variable of interest. This paper introduces the Dogit Ordered Generalized
Extreme Value (DOGEV) model, which does account for both ordering and
captivity (and/or multiple modes) in the data. In the spirit of Manski (1977),
the DOGEV model combines a model for choice set generation with the Or-
dered Generalized Extreme Value model. We illustrate the model using three
diﬀerent empirical examples: a model of employment contract types; an in-
ﬂationary expectations data set and; a survey of students’ evaluations of
teaching. These three examples are chosen as they represent diﬀerent values
that the additional ancillary parameters are likely to take in practice.
Keywords: Generalized extreme value, choice set generation, ordinal data.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C251 Introduction
The use of qualitative response discrete choice models is now widespread in
the ﬁelds of economics, transportation research and marketing, to name a few.
Predominantly this takes the form of analyzing unit data, often responses to
survey questionnaires. A distinguishing feature of many such data sets, is
that some (or all) of the outcomes of the variable of interest, have a certain
inherent attractiveness, over and above that determined by the individual’s
observed characteristics. This could be termed heterogeneity of the outcome.
Examples of such heterogeneity include numerical responses to particular
question of the type “how much do you think x will change over the next
year?”. Here the researcher is likely to witness the presence of digit pref-
erencing - certain numbers, such as 0, 5 and 10 tend to be favored. An
example from the marketing literature, would be in a model of consumer
brand choice. Here, in addition to relative prices, income etc., there may
well be “brand-loyalty” which additionally pulls individuals towards particu-
lar outcomes. A further example can be taken from the discrete labor supply
ﬁeld where, presumably for institutional reasons, workers are likely to be
restricted to the discretized labour supply hours corresponding to full-time,
part-time and non-work points. That is, although workers may prefer to
work “unusual” hours, these options are simply not open to them.
In essence, it is heterogeneity of the outcome(s) that is additionally at-
tracting individuals towards these. If the variable of interest strongly em-
bodies such captivity (or digit preferencing, or brand-loyalty), this could well
be evidenced by a multi-modal distribution of observed outcomes (although
1this is not necessarily the case). It is also the case, that in many modeling
instances, the variable of interest is also potentially ordered. Indeed, with all
of the above examples, as well as with many other ones, there is likely to be
ordering in the observed responses.
Traditionally the researcher would tackle a discrete choice modeling ex-
ercise using the multinomial logit (MNL) model. The MNL model is com-
putationally tractable but does embody strong behavioral assumptions. Re-
search has, therefore, focussed either upon computationally intensive estima-
tion methods that allow for the estimation of more ﬂexible discrete choice
models, such as the multinomial probit or random parameters logit mod-
els, or upon developing computationally tractable and ﬂexible functional
forms for discrete choice models. The latter has stemmed from McFadden’s
(McFadden 1978) Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) class of models. In-
deed, notwithstanding the huge advances in simulation based estimation,
there has recently been an upsurge of interest in deriving new models that
are members of the GEV class (see, for example, Breshanan, Stern, and
Trajtenberg 1997, Vovsha 1998, Koppelman and Wen 2000, Swait 2001, Wen
and Koppelman 2001).
On the other hand, when a researcher is faced with a discrete choice
modeling exercise where there are concerns about potential ordering in the
data, it is highly likely that ordered probit or logit models would be applied.
These models do account for the ordinal nature of the outcome but are not
consistent with the models derived from the random utility framework such
as the multinomial probit or GEV class of models. Of particular interest
to this paper is the one extension has been proposed to the GEV class of
2models by Small (1987) and Small (1994) to account for outcomes that are
implicitly ordered such that a stochastic correlation between choices of close
proximity is introduced into the model - the Ordered Generalized Extreme
Value (OGEV) model.
However, neither of these approaches speciﬁcally accounts for the situ-
ation described above, where there is captivity in the variable of interest
(which may be evidenced by clustering of observed responses around several
alternatives c.f. digit preferencing). A model that can account for this is
the DOGIT model (Gaudry and Dagenais 1979). In spite of its apparent
applicability in numerous situations, the DOGIT model has seldom been ap-
plied in practice (for examples, see Gaudry and Wills 1979, Gaudry 1980, Tse
1987, Bordley 1990, Kannan and Yim 2001, Chandrasekharan, McCarthy,
and Wright 1994). The DOGIT model contains additional parameters to
the standard MNL model, which are most easily interpreted as “captivity”,
“loyalty”, “gravity” or “preference” coeﬃcients. That is, the DOGIT mod-
els allows individuals to be captive to particular choices, for example if the
outcomes themselves possess qualities that make them more attractive in
some sense. Indeed, it is this particular aspect of the DOGIT model that
makes it so appropriate for multi-modal data such as digit preferencing where
individuals tend to gravitate to integers in multiples of 5 and 10.
Whilst the DOGIT model is able to cope with the potential captivity
and multiple modes in discrete choice data, a potential drawback is that,
as with the MNL model, it does not allow for any ordering in the data.1
1McFadden (1981) argues that a deﬁciency of the DOGIT model is its lack of consis-
tency with the standard RUM framework. However, as we show in this paper, the DOGIT
model is consistent with the broader framework of Manski (1977)
3In this paper we utilize the framework derived by Manski (1977) that ties
together the choice set generation process with the outcome selection process
to introduce a new model, the Dogit Ordered Generalized Extreme Value
(DOGEV) model. The DOGEV model combines the ﬂexibility of the random
utility maximization model that allows coeﬃcients to vary across outcomes
and the ordering and correlation of proximate choice properties of the OGEV
model, with the choice set generation process and implied captivity properties
of the DOGIT model. This yields a speciﬁcation that is able to model discrete
choice data that potentially exhibits captivity in the choice outcomes (and/or
is multi-modal) and ordinal in nature. It also allows for simple tests of both
ordering and captivity.
To illustrate the DOGEV model we apply it to three diﬀerent applica-
tions. These are chosen because they are interesting in their own right, and
also illustrate three likely scenarios a practitioner is likely to encounter. In
the DOGEV model the (additional) captivity parameters, to ensure a proper
probability density function, must be strictly greater or equal to zero. How-
ever, in practice some (or all) of these may be freely estimated to non-zero;
estimated to be zero or restricted a priori to be zero. The ﬁrst application
is based upon Brown, Farrell, Harris, and Sessions’s (2002) model, which
considers the ordering of employment-types according to their associated in-
come risk. Here, all of the captivity parameters are freely estimated to be
non-zero.
The second application is based on Australian inﬂationary expectations’
data. From a policy perspective, it is important to understand what drives
inﬂationary expectations. Such expectations have far reaching implications
4for the macroeconomy as a whole, especially in an environment of an ac-
tive inﬂationary setting policy regime. Inﬂationary expectations are likely
to aﬀect the processes of wage bargaining, price setting and asset allocation,
amongst other things, and as a consequence are likely to direct aﬀect mone-
tary policy and the activities of central banks. Again, this data is pertinent
for our purposes, as the numerical answers would appear to be ordered, and
there is clear evidence of digit preferencing at inﬂationary expectations of 0,
5 and 10%. In this application, all captivity parameters are estimated, and
some go to their boundary solutions of zero.
Finally, we consider a model of student evaluations of satisfaction with
the quality of a large ﬁrst-year undergraduate compulsory course in Statistics
taught in a business faculty in an Australian University. Since such data may
be used in the tenure and promotion process understanding the determinants
of successful outcomes is important. Such evaluation data is ordinal in nature
and, potentially, certain responses (e.g. strongly agree, strongly disagree and
neutral) may exercise a gravitational pull. Here, for a priori reasons, we
restrict some captivity parameters to be zero.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 the DOGEV model is
derived. Sections 3, 4 and 5, respectively contain the applications to: em-
ployment contract types, inﬂationary expectations and student evaluations.
Section 6 concludes.
2 A New Ordered Probability Model
As is common in the literature (Fry, Brooks, Comley, and Zhang 1993), we
start with the standard random utility maximization (RUM) model, with
5indirect utility function given by
Uij = Vij + εij, (1)
with i =1 ,...N,j=1 ,...J. Uij is the utility individual i gains from alter-
native j, which is typically assumed to be a (linear in parameters) function
of observed individual characteristics xi and of the characteristics of the out-
comes zij, such that Vij = x￿
iβj + z￿
ijα. Finally, εij is a random disturbance
term assumed to follow an independent Extreme Value distribution. The
individual is assumed to choose the outcome that maximizes utility. With








where to identify the model restrictions on the model parameters are required
(Maddala 1983).
2.1 The DOGIT Model
MNL models are popular in practice, primarily because of their simplicity
and ease of estimation. However, this simplicity does impose some strong
restrictions on the model, most notably that of the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA). The IIA property of MNL models, essentially says that
the odds ratio, Pij/Pik,j￿= k, is independent of all other alternatives, and
independent of additions to, and deletions from, the full choice set. In many
instances this appears to be an unrealistic assumption, a problem exacerbated
by the fact that tests for IIA generally have very poor power properties (Fry
and Harris 1996).
6A number of non-IIA alternatives to the MNL have been proposed. The
DOGIT model of Gaudry and Dagenais (1979) appears attractive for many
modelling instances, as its probabilities expand on the MNL ones of equation















A requirement of the DOGIT model is that, to ensure a proper probability
density function, the θ parameters, are non-negative, θj ≥ 0 ∀ j =1 ,...,J.
Consistent with the approach in Manski (1977), the DOGIT model can
also be conceptualized as arising from a two part choice process (Fry and
Harris 1996). Manski showed that the discrete choice problem comprises of
two components: a choice set generation process and (conditional on choice





where Bi is the set of all non-empty choice sets available to individual i,
Pi(j | C) is the probability that individual i chooses outcome j given that
the choice set is C and Pi(C) is the probability that individual i selects choice
set C. The number of choice sets available to an individual can in theory be
very large. Thus researchers typically place some restrictions on the choice
set generation process. In the ﬁrst component of the model we determine
the choice set selection probabilities, Pi(C) and in the second component we
determine the conditional outcome selection probabilities, Pi(j | C).
7For the DOGIT model an individual is assumed either “captive” to one of
the J outcomes or chooses from the full choice set. Therefore, the available
choice set faced by the individual, Bi = B ∀i, comprises J +1sets, J single
outcome “captivity sets” and one set comprising all J outcomes from which
“free choice” is (subsequently) exercised by the individual. The choice set
generation process itself can be represented as a random utility maximization
model with utilities given by
U
1
ik = Wik +  ik,i =1 ,...,n; k =1 ,...,J+1 . (4)
Under the assumptions that  ik are independent identically distributed
Extreme Value, that Wik = log(θk) and the normalization that WiJ+1 =0 ,















For the outcome selection process the probability that an individual
chooses the speciﬁed outcome j from a single outcome choice set is one and
the probability that an individual chooses the speciﬁed outcome j from the
full choice set is given by the standard RUM model that leads to the MNL

















The parameterization of equation (7) illustrates a further boundary con-
dition on the admissible range for the θj values (in addition to θj ≥ 0 ∀ j =
1,...,J). In the limit, the proportion choosing outcome j in a sample, must












Eﬀectively, this places an upper bound on the admissible θj values.
In such a parameterization, the θ’s can be interpreted as “preference”,
“loyalty” or “gravity” parameters or alternatively heterogeneity of the out-
come(s). Of course, it is possible to generalize the DOGIT model further by
allowing these gravity parameters to be a function of observed heterogeneity,
indeed, this is the parameterized Logit captivity model of Swait and Ben-
Akiva (1987). However, this is not considered in this paper, as the model is
already deemed to be suﬃciently heavily parameterized. As we do not para-
meterize the preference parameters but treat them as ﬁxed constants, they
can be thought of as representing unobserved heterogeneity of the outcome,
the strength of which can (and is almost certain to), vary across j,b u tb e
constant across i.
At one extreme, if the pull of these gravity parameters is “large” for any
particular outcome they are likely to dominate the ultimate choice probabili-
ties for that outcome - irrespective of observed personal heterogeneity. At the
other extreme, a zero θ value for an outcome results in choice probabilities
9being driven solely by observed heterogeneity. In between these extremes,
choice probabilities are a combination of the two. An example with regard
to modeling inﬂationary expectations, might be that if headline inﬂation
has been at 2% for several periods, θj=2 may be such that the probability
of choosing 2% is predominantly unaﬀected by individuals’ characteristics
which otherwise one would have expected to be inﬂuential - individuals are
simply drawn to this outcome.
2.2 The OGEV Model
Small (1987) introduces a discrete choice model, the Ordered Generalized Ex-
treme Value (OGEV), that is a member of the Generalized Extreme Value
class of models. Again, the OGEV probabilities expand on the MNL ones of
equation (2) such that IIA is no longer embodied. However, the underlying
motivation for the OGEV model is to provide a suitable model for outcomes
that are ordered in some sense, whilst still providing the ﬂexibility of the
MNL model, as compared to that of the ordered probit model, for exam-
ple. Unlike the MNL or DOGIT probabilities, the OGEV ones embody a
correlation between outcomes in close proximity. Such a correlation appears
likely for ordered data in many instances, especially where the observed out-
comes are realizations of an underlying latent scale. For example, given a
ﬁve-point response scale (j =1 ,...,5) say, of satisfaction, individuals may
choose “neutral” (j =3 ) , but be heavily inﬂuenced by the neighboring choices
of “moderately satisﬁed” (j =4 )and “moderately dissatisﬁed” (j =2 ) .
Although it is possible to allow the window of correlation to be arbitrarily
large, this increases the number of parameters to be estimated and makes
10estimation cumbersome (Small 1987). Therefore we restrict attention to the
standard OGEV model (Small 1987). In Small’s notation we have M =2
and ρr = ρ for all r. However, for some applications (such as our inﬂation-
ary expectations example), it is possible that the more ﬂexible correlation
structure implied by multiple ρ might be more appropriate. For reasons of
parsimony we do not consider this model variant.
The standard OGEV model implies a correlation between outcomes that
are near neighbors. Analogously to an moving average process, this correla-
tion decreases the further away two outcomes j and k are, and moreover is
zero when |j − k| > 2. Although they cannot be written explicitly in closed
form (Small 1987), these correlations are inversely related to the parameter










(exp(ρ−1Vij−1)+e x p( ρ−1Vij))
ρ−1
+ (exp(ρ−1Vij)+e x p( ρ−1Vij+1))
ρ−1￿
,
with the convention that exp(ρ−1Vi0)=e x p ( ρ−1ViJ+1)=0and 0 <ρ≤ 1.
As ρ → 1, OGEV probabilities converge to MNL ones, which gives a
simple parameter restriction (ρ =1 )based test of the OGEV versus MNL
formulations. Such a test is also implicitly a test of ordering versus non-
ordering of the outcomes in the choice set. Finally, we note that as ρ → 0,
the associated cumulative distribution function is a degenerate one, but one
still consistent with random utility maximization (Small 1987).
112.3 The DOGEV Model
The OGEV model does not allow for the phenomenon of captivity and/or
multiple modes and the DOGIT model does not allow either for the ordering
of outcomes or for the (potential) correlation of proximate outcomes. In this
section we combine the ideas underlying both the DOGIT and OGEV mod-
els to produce a new discrete choice model, the Dogit Ordered Generalized
Extreme Value (DOGEV) model.
The idea is to combine the two part choice generating process of the
DOGIT model with the proximate correlation and ordering of the OGEV
model. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the choice set generation process leading
to captive (or digit preference or brand-loyalty), probabilities is as in the
DOGIT formulation above. That is, we allow the outcomes themselves to
possess unobserved heterogeneity/characteristics which potentially attract
individuals to them. This attraction is in addition to any the outcomes
already possess, as determined by the individual and their observed charac-
teristics.
In the second component of the choice process, if free choice is exercised,
the selection probabilities are given by the OGEV formulation. Thus, using

















The nested models are therefore
12OGEV: θ1 = ...= θM =0 , 0 <ρ≤ 1,
DOGIT: ρ =1 , at least one θj > 0,j=1 ,...,J,
MNL: θ1 = ...= θM =0 ,ρ =1 ,
of which the last two do not imply ordering in the observed outcomes. This
model is ﬂexible whilst allowing one to model captive (and/or multi-modal)
ordinal data in a simple way. Models are nested within DOGEV in a way
that allows for hypothesis testing based model selection. Thus the DOGEV
model is not restricted to applications where clustering of observed responses
(multiple modes) and ordering is a potential data issue, but through its nested
variants (DOGIT, OGEV and MNL) may be used in any application where
the distribution of observed outcomes is either captive or multi-modal or
ordered or unordered.
The parameters of the DOGEV model can be consistently estimated using
the maximum likelihood criterion. By deﬁning an indicator variable dij as
dij =
￿
1 if individual i chooses alternative j
0 otherwise

































In practice, it is possible that some, all, or none of the captivity para-
meters may go their boundary solutions. Moreover, it is also possible to set
some of these captivity parameters to their lower boundary solutions for a
priori reasons. The following applications illustrate such scenarios. Note
that θk = 0, simply implies no captivity for choice k.
133 Application 1: Employment Contracts
In a recent paper Brown, Farrell, Harris, and Sessions (2002) consider the
degree of ‘income risk’ associated with the three broad types of employment
contract. Salaried employment, for example, implies relatively stable pay. In
contrast, a self-employed worker can oﬀer increasingly competitive tenders as
the demand for his/her labor services declines, thereby maintaining a vestige
of employment, albeit at or near his/her reservation wage. For such indi-
viduals price is ﬂuid. PRP contracts, comprising an element of both ﬁxed
and variable pay, oﬀer a middle road between these two extremes. That is,
Brown, Farrell, Harris, and Sessions (2002) attempt to explain an individ-
ual’s employment contract-type, whilst recognizing that these outcomes are
necessarily ordered in terms of their associated income risk - the presump-
tion is that self-employment is relatively more risky than PRP, which is itself
relatively more risky than salaried employment.
If individuals were identical in terms of their attitudes towards risk, and
in the absence of ability and/or capital constraints, one would anticipate a
pooling equilibrium with all workers ﬂocking to one of the three contacts.
More realistically, a spectrum of risk aversion and the presence of such con-
straints would imply a separating equilibrium, with the expected utility of
employment across each of the three contracts types being equalized.2 Fol-
lowing Brown and Sessions (2002), a spectrum of contracts is assumed, which
can be nested in the illustrative form
wj = (1 − λj)¯ w + λjf (e,ζ) (11)
2Here we focus on a simpliﬁed model, and do not consider the relationship between
individuals’ risk preference/aversion and their choice of employment contract-type.
14where: j = s,prp and se (denoting ‘salaried’, ‘PRP’ and ‘self-employment’,
respectively); wj denotes total remuneration; ¯ w the component of total remu-
neration that is independent of worker performance; f (e,ζ) some function
mapping the relationship between worker performance, ζ, and a stochastic
parameter, e and; λj the proportion of total remuneration that is dependent
upon performance. It is presumed that λs =0 , λprp ∈{ 0,1} and λse =1 ,
such that ws =¯ w, wprp =( 1 − λprp)¯ w + λprpf (e,ζ) and wse = f (e,ζ).
For simplicity assume that ζ can take two values - “high” H, and “low” L,
ζ =( ζH,ζL), with f (e,ζH) >f(e,ζL), the range of income to which an
individual is exposed is deﬁned by ∆w = λj [f (e,ζH) − f (e,ζL)],w i t ht h e
implication that income risk is increasing in λj.
A similar dataset, but simpliﬁed speciﬁcation, is used as in Brown, Farrell,
Harris, and Sessions (2002). The data comes from the Family Expenditure
Survey (FES), which is a nationally representative survey conducted in the
United Kingdom. Some 10,000 households are selected each year to take
part, and the average response rate is approximately 70%. The main aim
of the survey is to provide a reliable source of information on household
expenditure, income and other aspects of household ﬁnances. It contains
detailed information on employment contracts, individual speciﬁc charac-
teristics and household speciﬁc characteristics. The sub-sample comprises
of working adults aged between 18 and 65 who are either self-employed or
salaried or a contract characterized by a bonus scheme (bonus). Pooling the
annual years 1997-1998, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000, gives us a large working
sample of over thirteen and a half thousand individuals.
153.1 Results
The DOGEV estimation results are presented in Table 1. Although focus
is not on the structural part of the model, it appears to be relatively well
speciﬁed, with region, education, occupational class, industry, age, housing
tenure-type and number of children, all appearing to strongly aﬀect the choice
of employment contract-type.
Turning to the ancillary parameters, all of the θj’s are signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero (recalling that these are one-sided tests, due to the con-
straint that θj ≥ 0 ∀ j = 1,...,J). It appears that the extent of captivity
is strongest for salaried workers, then PRP workers and ﬁnally, the self-
employed. This could well be due to institutional constraints or demand side
(employer) eﬀects (for example, more salaried positions are available than
PRP ones, than self-employment ones). It may also represent the fact that
individuals are inherently risk averse and drawn to the reduced income risk
associated with salaried contracts.
In terms of ρ, the parameter is strongly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
However, as ρ → 1, the DOGEV→MNL, and the extent of correlation is
therefore inversely related to ρ, being zero when ρ =1 . Therefore, there
is only weak evidence of ordering in employment contact-types. However,
recalling that this parameterization embodies the standard OGEV model,
which implies a correlation between near neighbors only, it might be the case
that it is diﬃcult to precisely estimate ρ when J is “small” (here J =3 ),
akin to eﬀective sample size arguments and the MNL estimation of β.
163.2 Some Model Evaluations
Due to the complexity of such a model, it is unclear from the estimated
coeﬃcients how well the model describes the data, and moreover what the
implications for the data are. Here we present the results from a brief exercise
which attempts to do this. In Figure 1 we present sample proportions of
observed choices (as a reference point), along with the implied extent of
DOGEV “preference” for each contract-type. In addition we also present the
total predicted probabilities of the DOGEV model, evaluated at the sample
means of the explanatory variables.
As can be seen, the DOGEV model appears to ﬁt the data well, closely
replicating the observed sample proportions. The relative size of the esti-
mated θ parameters is translated into the extent of captivity for each choice.
Therefore, we witness that regardless of observed personal characteristics, the
estimated probability that an (employed) individual will choose a salaried
contract, is 30%. Once one additionally includes (average) personal char-
acteristics, this over doubles to just under 70%. Total probabilities for an
individual choosing, or being in, a PRP contract, are signiﬁcantly lower, but
again about half of this is driven by individuals being captive to this choice.
In total, the typical individual has a 7% chance of being self-employed, of
which 2 percentage points arise from captivity, with the remainder being
driven by observed characteristics and the associated OGEV probabilities.
In summary, allowing for ordering and captivity/preferencing in the data
appears to yield sensible estimates. Moreover, in terms of predicted probabil-
ities for a “typical” individual compared to sample proportions, the DOGEV
17model appears to ﬁt the data well, in addition to having a sensible interpre-
tation.
4 Application 2: Inﬂationary Expectations
Inﬂationary expectations have wide reaching implications for the economy as
a whole - especially so in a policy regime of active inﬂation targeting. For
example, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) is currently committed to
an annual rate of inﬂation in the range of 2 - 3%. Such inﬂation targeting
is also prevalent throughout Europe. Such expectations are likely to aﬀect
price setting, wage bargaining and asset allocation, for example. For mone-
tary authorities, therefore, it is important to know what drives inﬂationary
expectations. Very little work, appears to have been undertaken which seeks
to explain inﬂationary expectations at an individual level. Here we use Aus-
tralian unit record data from the Melbourne Institute’s Survey of Consumer
Inﬂationary Expectations. The survey is a stratiﬁed random sample of 1,200
respondents, conducted monthly. Respondents are asked a wide variety of
questions, including what they expect inﬂation to be over the coming year.
In addition, many personal demographics are also recorded. Three months
(February, March and April, 1999) were pooled and treated as a single cross
section. As oﬃcial headline inﬂation in Australia, the Consumer Price Index,
is a quarterly series, and the three months chosen span a stable inﬂationary
climate (the annual rate of increase in the CPI Q1, 1999 was 1.2%), such a
pooling appears to be justiﬁed.
In our analysis we adopt a framework within which it is assumed that
in forming their inﬂationary expectations, individuals are utility maximiz-
18ers. That is, the extent of “sophistication” of their forecasts (in terms of
expenditures of time and resources in obtaining such) will be an increasing
function of the beneﬁts that they are likely to obtain from a more accurate
forecast. Therefore, it is likely that, along with other (economic) variables,
inﬂationary expectations are driven by certain socio-demographic attributes
that the individual possesses. In other words, diﬀerent individuals have ac-
cess to diﬀerent information sets. These diﬀerent information sets are, in
part, a function of personal characteristics or attributes. Moreover, the ex-
tent to which these information sets are used is, again in part, determined
by the individual’s utility maximizing process.
It is expected a priori, that the accumulation of knowledge with age is
likely to exert a positive inﬂuence on the sophistication of individuals’ fore-
casts, as is the level of education. Those individuals with a close proximity
to the price setting process are likely to be more aware of the inﬂationary
climate. In the empirical example, we choose occupations of “managers”
and “sales-persons” to proxy these. An indicator of voting intentions is also
included, as there is evidence that Opposition voters tend to have more pes-
simistic inﬂationary expectations (see Brischetto and DeBrouwer 1999). We
also include a dummy for place of residence, as this also may aﬀect avail-
able information sets. Finally, it has been argued that there will be dif-
ferences between male and female inﬂationary expectations, to the extent
that one gender spends relatively more time retail shopping (Batchelor and
Jonung 1986).
In our data observed inﬂationary expectations contained some quite large
values, ranging from -50% to 80%. Estimation was based upon only those
19respondents who elicited a “sensible” expectation, deﬁned as 0% ≤ Pe ≤ 10%
(Brischetto and DeBrouwer 1999).3 Selecting the data in this way yields
results that are not based on unrealistic observations (outliers) and yields
a data set with an appropriate number of alternatives, which additionally
are contiguous. Importantly, the data are ordered, discrete (only integer
responses are recorded) and there is signiﬁcant evidence of digit preferencing
(expectations of 0, 5 and 10% are quite obviously favored). In addition to
the digit preferencing, there is also signiﬁcant mass at expectation points 2
and 3%, which correspond to the prevailing headline rate at the time of the
surveys, and moreover the RBA’s inﬂation target range of 2-3%. A priori,
one would expect the digit preferenced outcomes to exhibit a non-zero extent
of captivity.
4.1 Results
The parameter estimates for the DOGEV model are reported in Table 2.
Once more, the model seems to be relatively well speciﬁed with strong sig-
niﬁcance on many of the observed demographic variables. Ordering appears
to be important, as ρ is strongly signiﬁcant. Indeed, ρ diﬀers signiﬁcantly
from both zero and one. Since correlation is inversely related to ρ, we note
that the estimated value of 0.5 implies a relatively high level of correlation
between adjacent categories (expectations). Considering the captivity para-
meters we ﬁnd signiﬁcant parameters for expectations of 0%, 1%, 2% and
7% (θ0, θ1, θ2 and θ7). Interestingly, the largest eﬀect is given by θ2 which
corresponds closely to the well publicized target inﬂation band of 2-3% per
3Of course, in a low inﬂation environment, some negative expected inﬂation rates may
be considered reasonable.
20annum. As expected the heavily digit-preferenced outcome of zero inﬂation,
is signiﬁcant, although somewhat surprisingly, not that for either 5 or 10%.
Note that, unlike the previous example, some of the θ values have gone to
their lower boundary solutions of zero (θ5 and θ9).
In summary, we can say that these results clearly indicate that both
captivity and ordering eﬀects should be in this model of inﬂationary expec-
tations. The DOGEV model is, therefore, clearly an improvement over all of
its nested sub-models.
5 Application 3: Student Evaluations
Our ﬁnal application involves the analysis of students’ evaluation of a large
ﬁrst year, compulsory introductory statistics subject, taught in a business
faculty in an Australian University. The data comprises 1,647 students cov-
ering the four years 1997 to 2000 and interest focusses upon the response to
one particular question “Overall I was satisﬁed with the quality of this sub-
ject”. Students respond to this by indicating their strength of agreement on
a ﬁve point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. It is not unusual
for the average score on this question to be used as evidence in the tenure and
promotion processes, and in inter-department or cross faculty comparisons.
However, various levels of disquiet are typically expressed about this process
as reliance on the single ﬁgure might blur the issues.
Here we take responses to certain other questions in the evaluation sur-
veys to help understand the level of student satisfaction with the quality of
the subject. The (explanatory) variables chosen are the responses - level of
agreement - with the statements: “The subject was intellectually stimulat-
21ing” (C4), “The subject developed my skills in areas relevant to the ﬁeld”
(C3), “The subject developed my understanding of key concepts”( C 2 )a n d
“The tutor is readily available for consultation with the student” (T5). For
parsimony these variables are treated as continuous explanatory variables in
our modeling. Additionally, we also include indicator variables for the survey
year.
The evaluation surveys do not contain any information on the individual
students, such as class attendance, academic performance, age or gender. As
a result we might expect the θ parameters to play an important role, as they
may absorb some unobserved heterogeneity of the individual, as well as that
of the choice outcome. Furthermore, a priori, we might expect there to be
some attraction to the two ends of the scale that the responses to the state-
ments C4, C3, C2 and T5 may not be able to capture. This would suggest
that only these two end θ parameters may be signiﬁcant. Alternatively, one
could a priori restrict the appropriate θ parameters to zero. The DOGEV
model allows us to investigate these issues.
5.1 Results
The parameter estimates for the DOGEV model are reported in Table 3. In
preliminary estimations we found that the θ parameters relating to disagree,
neutral and agree were indeed, statistically insigniﬁcant. Thus the model
presented in Table 3 has excluded these parameters. Likelihood ratio tests of
the DOGEV model against its nested sub-models MNL, DOGIT and OGEV
were 45.96, 15.99, and 29.10 with 3, 1 and 2 degrees of freedom respectively.
Clearly the DOGEV speciﬁcation is to be preferred. Wald tests of ρ = 1 or
22ρ =0also reject the null.
The results therefore, indicate clear evidence of ordering and of captivity
(to the extremes of the choice outcome scale). However, the actual degree
of captivity is small with the choice set (captivity) probabilities for strongly
disagree being 0.005 and for strongly agree being 0.006. Hence, in practical
terms, the responses to C4, C3, C2, T5 and the year eﬀects determine the
outcome. For example, in Table 4 we use the model to predict the proba-
bility of stylized students (in 1997) who are “dissatisﬁed” (strongly disagree
to the statements C4, C3, C2 and T5), “neutral” (undecided/neutral to the
statements) and “satisﬁed” (strongly agree to the statements). In addition,
we also report the (full) sample proportions of observed choices. As can be
seen, a dissatisﬁed student will have an 85% chance of overall being dissatis-
ﬁed with the quality of the subject, this compares with 14% for the neutral
student. At the other end of the spectrum, the satisﬁed student has a 98%
chance of overall being satisﬁed with the quality of the subject. Using the
maximum probability rule, we would predict that the dissatisﬁed, neutral and
satisﬁed student, would respectively disagree, be neutral and strongly agree,
to the statement “Overall I was satisﬁed with the quality of this subject”.
It is important to note that the θ parameters corresponding to the ends of
the response scale, help in putting probability mass into these infrequently
chosen alternatives.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a new model, the Dogit Ordered Generalized
Extreme Value (DOGEV) model, that can deal with data that is both or-
23dinal and potentially embodies an extent of captivity (which may, or may
not, be reﬂected by a multi-modal distribution of observed outcomes). The
DOGEV model is attractive with regard to three main facets: it has the ﬂex-
ibility of the multinomial logit (MNL) model in allowing coeﬃcients to vary
across alternatives (Small 1987), it embodies the ordering and correlation
of proximate outcomes properties of the ordered generalized extreme value
(OGEV) model and it also allows one to estimate the extent of any captiv-
ity/preferencing/loyalty in the choice process, as exhibited by the DOGIT
model. It is a simple, parsimonious and ﬂexible model that has the additional
beneﬁt of nesting certain key sub-models (DOGIT, OGEV and MNL).
The attractiveness and potential usefulness of this new model was clearly
illustrated with three separate applications. Firstly, it was applied to an
employment contract-type model, where there was some evidence of ordering
and compelling evidence that workers are captive (to diﬀering extents) to the
various contract types, to an extent over and above that suggested simply
by their personal characteristics. There was stronger evidence of ordering
with regard to inﬂationary expectations, although somewhat surprisingly,
individuals did not appear to be particularly captive to the a priori digit
preferenced numbers/outcomes. Finally, there was again compelling evidence
for ordering in our student evaluation data. Here however, we restrict some
captivity parameters to be zero a priori which helps to put probability mass
into the infrequently chosen outcomes, on the basis of a paucity of observed
individual characteristics. Indeed, these (extreme) captivity parameters were
strongly signiﬁcant.
In summary, the applications have shown that the model is likely to be
24attractive in situations where one wishes to model unit record data that
are both ordinal and potentially exhibit an extent of captivity in the choice
outcome process. Moreover, it appears straightforward to extend the model
to explain the captivity parameters (which may reﬂect demand-side eﬀects,
for example) in terms of observables - thus giving much greater insight into
the economic data generating process than is aﬀorded by more simple discrete
choice models. Indeed, it is likely that such models will be applicable to many
areas of interest, such as occupational choice and discretized labor supply
choice.
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Figure 1: Implied DOGEV Probabilities and Sample Proportions
30Table 1: Employment Contract Types
PRP Self Employed
Constant -4.02 (1.31)∗∗ -8.37 (1.39)∗∗
Black -0.43 (0.44) -0.38 (0.44)
Asian -1.29 (0.84) 0.43 (0.27)
Other Ethnic 0.01 (0.40) 0.23 (0.44)
Male 0.61 (0.21)∗∗ 1.20 (0.25)∗∗
Married 0.16 (0.13) 0.59 (0.21)∗∗
Separated 0.24 (0.20) 0.60 (0.26)∗∗
Wales -0.41 (0.30) -0.09 (0.22)
Scotland -0.17 (0.30) -0.07 (0.29)
North 0.04 (0.15) -0.12 (0.16)
Midlands -0.27 (0.17) -0.33 (0.17)∗
South 0.10 (0.12) -0.30 (0.13)∗∗
G.C.S.E.s 0.16 (0.16) -0.06 (0.12)
Further Education 0.35 (0.20)∗ -0.04 (0.15)
Higher Education 0.16 (0.17) -0.07 (0.15)
Renting 0.03 (0.25) 1.32 (0.30)∗∗
Mortgage 0.71 (0.30)∗∗ 0.80 (0.22)∗∗
House Owned 0.38 (0.25) 1.19 (0.27)∗∗
Managerial 0.04 (0.15) -0.52 (0.18)∗∗
Skilled -0.70 (0.33)∗∗ 0.05 (0.17)
Semi Skilled -0.71 (0.33)∗∗ -0.55 (0.25)∗∗
Unskilled -1.22 (0.56)∗∗ 0.02 (0.31)
Manufacturing -0.01 (0.11) -0.71 (0.17)∗∗
Services -1.51 (0.45)∗∗ -1.58 (0.31)∗∗
Age/10 1.69 (0.66)∗∗ 2.38 (0.53)∗∗
Age2/100 -0.23 (0.09)∗∗ -0.23 (0.06)∗∗
# Pre-school Children 0.15 (0.11) 0.36 (0.13)∗∗







31Table 2: Inﬂationary Expectations Results
j =1 j =2 j =3 j =4 j =5
Constant -1.73 (1.92) 0.17 (1.08) 1.03 (1.01) 0.32 (1.45) 2.23 (0.59)∗∗
Male 0.11 (0.52) -0.09 (0.42) -0.32 (0.07)∗∗ -0.36 (0.23) -0.80 (0.20)∗∗
Age -0.06 (0.10) -0.23 (0.17) -0.08 (0.05) -0.07 (0.06) -0.09 (0.05)∗
Income -0.12 (0.06)∗∗ -0.09 (0.07) -0.10 (0.05)∗∗ -0.12 (0.05)∗∗ -0.13 (0.04)∗∗
Urban 0.59 (0.67) -0.48 (0.48) -0.09 (0.19) -0.14 (0.21) 0.06 (0.17)
Manager 0.39 (0.61) 0.79 (0.83) -0.17 (0.22) -0.30 (0.26) -0.61 (0.23)∗∗
Sales -1.44 (1.67) 0.55 (0.82) -0.27 (0.29) -0.29 (0.31) -0.47 (0.26)∗
Education 0.11 (0.10) -0.02 (0.09) 0.01 (0.04) 0.07 (0.09) -0.02 (0.04)
Opposition 0.51 (0.37) 0.81 (0.47) 0.58 (0.20)∗∗ 0.93 (0.29)∗∗ 0.91 (0.28)∗∗
j =6 j =7 j =8 j =9 j =1 0
Constant -3.80 (6.75) -2.62 (1.59)∗ -1.95 (1.56) 0.53 (1.20) 2.04 (0.63)∗∗
Male 0.95 (4.81) -0.66 (0.23)∗∗ -0.36 (0.43) -0.20 (0.69) -1.09 (0.26)∗∗
Age 0.25 (0.42) 0.24 (0.20) 0.11 (0.15) -0.48 (0.25)∗∗ -0.11 (0.06)∗∗
Income -0.14 (0.14) -0.39 (0.23)∗ -0.09 (0.09) -0.09 (0.13) -0.19 (0.06)∗∗
Urban 0.31 (0.62) 1.07 (0.04)∗∗ 0.14 (0.46) -1.75 (0.88)∗∗ -0.19 (0.19)
Manager 0.31 (0.92) 0.51 (0.18)∗∗ -0.10 (0.56) 0.01 (1.64) -0.39 (0.28)
Sales 1.03 (2.12) 1.59 (0.85)∗ -0.48 (0.81) -2.88 (4.65) -0.22 (0.29)
Education -0.27 (0.17) -0.50 (0.52) -0.02 (0.10) -0.11 (0.19) -0.03 (0.05)















32Table 3: Student Evaluations
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Constant -1.32 (1.19) -3.13 (1.24)∗∗ -7.64 (1.33)∗∗ -19.96 (2.27)∗∗
C4 0.89 (0.33)∗∗ 1.18 (0.34)∗∗ 1.52 (0.36)∗∗ 2.04 (0.37)∗∗
C3 0.69 (0.25)∗∗ 0.89 (0.26)∗∗ 1.30 (0.27)∗∗ 2.10 (0.37)∗∗
C2 0.17 (0.22) 0.51 (0.23)∗∗ 0.89 (0.23)∗∗ 1.80 (0.32)∗∗
T5 -0.07 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.29 (0.12)∗∗ 0.80 (0.24)∗∗
1998 -0.72 (0.97) -1.50 (1.00) -1.86 (1.02)∗ -0.78 (1.09)
1999 -1.16 (0.83) -1.33 (0.83) -1.65 (0.84)∗ -1.61 (0.86)∗
2000 -0.95 (0.87) -1.08 (0.88) -1.23 (0.89) -1.37 (0.92)
θstrongly disagree 0.01 (0.00)∗∗




Table 4: Student Evaluations: Predicted Probabilities for Stylized Students
Overall I was satisﬁed Stylized Student Type:
with the quality of this subject: Dissatisﬁed Neutral Satisﬁed Sample
Strongly Disagree 0.29 0.01 0.01 0.04
Disagree 0.56 0.13 0.00 0.21
Neutral 0.13 0.54 0.01 0.28
Agree 0.01 0.31 0.11 0.40
Strongly Agree 0.01 0.01 0.87 0.07
33